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For most of my sociological career I have been involved in an attempt to understand 
how ‘the problem of suffering’ is configured and experienced under conditions of 
modernity, and how, moreover, it operates as an innovative force within processes of 
social change. I argue that the main ‘founder fathers’ of sociology - Marx, Weber and 
Durkheim – are all preoccupied with this matter, and in the contexts of their theoretical 
projects, offer perspectives on particular components of human suffering and their 
wider political and cultural significance.  
 
Marx holds an ambiguous standpoint on the problem of human suffering. Scholars 
readily identify him as committed to the attempt to document the ways in which 
capitalism renders people as docile bodies for exploitation, and thereby subjects them 
to experiences of ‘physical deterioration’, ‘intellectual degeneration’ and ‘moral 
degradation’.  Yet, Marx does not appear to have arrived at a settled account of how 
individuals are prone to respond to this; or rather, when reflecting on this matter it seems 
that he is in two minds over what takes place. On the one hand, in the famous passage 
where Marx identifies the ‘opium’ of religion as ‘an expression of real suffering and a 
protest against real suffering’, he places an emphasis on the potential for human 
affliction to inspire people to take flight from ‘the truth of the here and now’ in favour 
of the ‘illusory happiness’ of life in the hereafter. On the other hand, there are passages 
where he identifies the experience of suffering as a ‘sensuous knowledge’ that works to 
make individuals more consciously alert to the material conditions of their existence, 
and which holds the potential to inspire them to join together as a class committed to 
abolish capitalism.  In this regard, Marx appears to be arguing that the problem of 
suffering operates both to disable and enable ‘class consciousness’, but he does not offer 
us any guidance when it comes to understanding how destructive and painful 
experiences that work to enforce and consolidate human alienation might be 
transfigured so that they operate to release our ‘essential powers’ and human potential.  
 
Weber is largely preoccupied with explaining how experiences of suffering are set to 
be encountered and understood as involving us in a painful deficit of moral meaning.  
He assumes that human reason is never adequate to match and vanquish ‘the irrational 
force’ of suffering. Weber holds that the problem of suffering consists in the fact that it 
always retains a capacity to appear senseless and morally outrageous. Moreover, his 
overwhelmingly pessimistic assessment of our cultural fate, and of the presiding forms 
of social psychology shaped under the influence of modern rationality, leads him to 
conclude that the existential scale and volume of human suffering is set to grow along 
with conditions of modernity. On his account, the problem of suffering operates to 
inspire an insatiable quest for ever more intellectually coherent and practically relevant 
rationalisations of reality, which have the unintended consequence of making us yet 
more tormented by the apparent ‘senselessness’ of human affliction.  Weber holds that 
‘the more highly rationalized an order, the greater the tension, the greater the exposure 
of major elements of a population to experiences that are frustrating in the very specific 
sense, not merely that things happen that contravene their interests, but that things 
happen that are ‘meaningless’ in the sense that they ought not to happen’ (Parsons 1966: 
xlvii). Accordingly, it might be argued that the normative expectations created by 
modern medicine for our health, and by technological advancements that ensure greater 
levels of public safety, have some unanticipated and deeply troubling side effects. On 
occasions when medicine cannot protect or save us, or where safety systems fail and 
‘disaster strikes’, we are left feeling more painfully exposed than ever before to ‘the 
irrational force of life’ and more existentially traumatised by the fact that we have no 
means to escape our fate. Weber appears to conclude that we are set to inhabit a cultural 
reality where it is made increasingly difficult for us endure the inherent antinomies of 
human existence, and especially when it comes to the task of bestowing this with 
sufficient moral meaning. 
 
Durkheim also shares in the view that under social conditions of modernity, the problem 
of suffering is set to become a more morally perplexing and intellectually frustrating 
component of human experience. At one point in The Division of Labour in Society, he 
asks ‘Is it true that the happiness of the individual increases as man advances?’, and 
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answers his question by declaring that ‘Nothing is more doubtful’. Durkheim contends 
while ‘there is a host of pleasures open to us today that more simple natures knew 
nothing about….on the other hand, we are exposed to a host of sufferings spared them, 
and it is not at all certain that the balance is to our advantage….If we are open to more 
pleasures, we are also open to more pain’ (Durkheim [1893] 1964: 241-2). With a focus 
brought to experiences of egoism and anomie, Durkheim is particularly concerned by 
the emotional and psychological consequences of social conditions that result in us 
having no choice but to choose who we are, how to live and what to be. On this account, 
the problem of suffering is greatly intensified through processes of individualisation 
that leave us more anxiously preoccupied with questions of moral meaning and feeling 
painfully bereft of belonging.  Yet, at the same time, at least when compared to Marx 
and Weber, Durkheim is alert to the potential for the social forces that produce egoism 
and anomie to also involve us in moral sentiments whereby we are inclined to be more 
sympathetically oriented towards the suffering of others. He identifies what we feel for 
our ourselves and for others as belonging to the ‘the same moral state’ (Durkheim 
[1897] 1952: 360). In this regard, in his later work he is increasingly preoccupied by a 
paradox for which there is no adequate social, cultural or political solution. Durkheim 
portrays our social psychology as inherently inconsistent and contradictory.  Arguably, 
moreover, while exposing the polarities of the moral conflicts we inhabit, his analysis 
works more to set problems for sociological investigation than to advance practicable 
solutions.  
 
I argue that in the twenty first century we are living under social, cultural and economic 
conditions that are intensifying the problem of suffering. I further hold that the analyses 
of the above-mentioned classical theorists remain useful as guides for those working to 
understand how this is set to take place. Over the last fifty years or so, considerable 
advancements have been made in the documentation of the social determinants of health 
inequalities, and unprecedented amounts of evidence are now accumulated to 
accompany theoretical insights with empirical analysis. In this regard, the deteriorating 
physical health conditions of lower income households serve to underline the ongoing 
importance of studies that profile the structural violence of class conditions and 
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experiences.  Moreover, I suggest that some of the dimensions of the problem of 
suffering explored by Durkheim and Weber are particularly useful for locating the 
worsening crisis in our mental health within a sociological frame -  although these are 
more fitted to alert us to the social and cultural contradictions of our existence than to 
provide us with moral guidance on how to live and or what to do to make this better. 
 
Moving beyond the classics, I am also inclined to argue that in seeking to better 
understand how modern people are disposed to experience and respond to the problem 
of suffering, we are also set to engage with the fact that a great deal of contemporary 
sociology is now embroiled in conjecture.  On many accounts, new communication and 
information technologies are operating to radically transform our visual culture and 
experience in ways that were unknown to previous generations. Social media are 
reconfiguring our networks, associations and attachments in ways that are without 
precedent, and which hold many uncertain consequences. In these conditions it is 
widely held that people are undergoing new experiences of self-formation and that our 
social subjectivities, value commitments and affective ties are being reconstituted in 
ways that confound traditions of sociological conception and evaluation. More than ever 
before, and with greater volume and intensity, it seems that ‘all that is solid melts into 
air’ and many judgements and opinions are made to appear outmoded before they are 
adequately formed.  In these respects, there are many elements in our experience and 
response to human suffering where we are challenged to make sense of domains of 
agency and affect that are changing our moral experience of self and society in ways 
that are not readily comparable to anything encountered in our past, and which remain 
barely understood now. Human suffering is being made more publicly visible; and 
especially that of distant ‘strangers’. Arguably we are witness to new possibilities for 
the founding and extension of ‘empathic civilization’; yet at the same time, what is often 
made more immediately present to us is the apparent dearth of social sympathy and the 




Durkkheim, E. ([1893]  1964) The Division of Labour in Society, New York: The Free 
 Press 
Durkheim, E.([1897 1952) Suicide: A Sociological Study, London: Routledge & 
 Kegan Paul 
Parsons, T., (1966) ‘Introduction’ to M. Weber, The Sociology of Religion, London: 
 Methuen 
 
